Anonymity In Cyberspace: Judicial and Legislative Regulations by Qasir, Sophia
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 81 Issue 6 Article 14 
2013 
Anonymity In Cyberspace: Judicial and Legislative Regulations 
Sophia Qasir 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sophia Qasir, Anonymity In Cyberspace: Judicial and Legislative Regulations, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 3651 
(2013). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol81/iss6/14 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
  
3651 




Historically, the scope of constitutional protections for fundamental 
rights has evolved to keep pace with new social norms and new technology.  
Internet speech is on the rise.  The First Amendment protects an 
individual’s right to speak anonymously, but to what extent does it protect a 
right to anonymous online speech?  This question is difficult because the 
government must balance the fundamental nature of speech rights with the 
potential dangers associated with anonymous online speech, including 
defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  While lower courts have held that there is a right to anonymous 
online speech, they have not yet adopted a common standard.  Meanwhile, 
to simplify the confusion and protect the rights of those who are injured by 
anonymous online speech, state legislatures are seeking to restrict some or 
all anonymous online-speech rights. 
This Note explores the history of speech regulation, with a special focus 
on the history of anonymous online speech, and the justifications for 
protecting speech rights.  It then discusses the judicial standards under 
which courts require disclosure of anonymous speakers and the current 
legislative proposals to restrict speech rights.  Next, this Note suggests that 
legislatures should not restrict speech rights, and should instead expand the 
remedies available to those injured by harmful speech.  This Note also 
suggests that courts should adopt a summary judgment standard that 
requires plaintiffs to provide evidence demonstrating that the anonymous 
speaker has committed a tort before requiring the speaker to disclose his or 
her identity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Anonymous speech has played an integral role in American history—
both proponents and opponents of ratification of the U.S. Constitution used 
anonymous speech to convey their arguments to the general public.1  The 
Supreme Court has implicitly and explicitly recognized that the right to free 
speech includes the right to speak anonymously.2  However, the expansion 
 
 1. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay wrote the Federalist Papers 
under the pseudonym of “Publius” to promote acceptance of the U.S. Constitution. See 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, FEDERALIST PAPERS (Goldwin Smith, 
ed. 1901).  The Anti-Federalists, who opposed the ratification of the Constitution, also wrote 
under pseudonyms, using the names Brutus, Cato, and Centinel. See HERBERT J. STORING, 
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (1981). 
 2. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 
536 U.S. 150, 166–67 (2002) (finding a law that required a permit to distribute pamphlets 
door-to-door was unconstitutional, because it infringed upon the speaker’s First Amendment 
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of the internet is stretching the outer limits of anonymous speech rights.  
While the internet allows speakers to reach a broad audience quickly, it also 
allows speakers to cause harm through destructive speech. Common 
problems associated with anonymous online speech include defamation,3 
tortious interference with business,4 and copyright infringement.5  Although 
the Supreme Court has held that free speech rights apply on the internet,6 it 
has not yet addressed the scope of anonymous online-speech rights.  
So far, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have held that there is a 
constitutional right to speak anonymously but have not adopted a standard 
to define the scope of that right.7  For example, some jurisdictions require 
the plaintiff to meet a summary judgment standard before the court will 
allow disclosure of a commenter’s identity.8  In other jurisdictions, the 
plaintiff may need to win on a balancing test that weighs the interest of 
disclosure against the interest in anonymity9 or merely show good-faith10 
before he can discover the commenter’s identity.   
Several state legislatures have also tried to address the scope of 
protections available to anonymous speakers,11 but only one state has 
succeeded in passing legislation that outlines the standard by which an 
anonymous speaker’s identity can be disclosed to the interested party.12  
 
rights); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995) (“[T]he 
anonymity of an author is not ordinarily a sufficient reason to exclude her work product from 
the protections of the First Amendment.”); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) 
(holding that a regulation prohibiting the distribution of anonymous handbills was 
unconstitutional). 
 3. See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). 
 4. See, e.g., Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (D. 
Nev. 2008) (noting that the plaintiff alleged that the defendant unlawfully interfered in the 
plaintiff’s business through an online smear campaign using anonymous postings). 
 5. See, e.g., Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004). 
 6. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 7. Compare SI03, Inc. v. Bodybuilding.com, LLC, 441 F. App’x 431, 433 (9th Cir. 
2011) (vacating the district court’s decision to apply the summary judgment standard, 
because the district court had not identified “the nature of the speech in question”), with In re 
Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in applying a summary judgment standard).  The Fourth 
Circuit addressed the issue of anonymous online speech in Peterson v. National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration, 478 F.3d 626, 633–34 (4th Cir. 2007), 
but did not address the substantive scope of the right to anonymous speech, instead finding 
that the right to anonymity was not challenged because the petitioner lacked standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of the act.  For a discussion of the various standards that 
courts have adopted, see infra Part III.A. 
 8. E.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). 
 9. E.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999); 
Dendrite Int’l Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
 10. E.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Cir. Ct. 
2000). 
 11. See infra Part III.B. 
 12. Virginia has enacted legislation that established a uniform standard for granting 
“John Doe” subpoenas, but does not directly restrict anonymous speech. See VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 8.01-407.1 (2012).  California considered similar legislation. A.B. 1143, 2003 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2003), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_1101-
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Two states have passed legislation that restricts the anonymous speech 
rights of convicted sex offenders.13  The government, however, cannot 
restrict the right to free speech without complying with due process 
requirements of the Fifth Amendment because it is a fundamental right.14  
Moreover, individuals need sufficient notice of what speech is protected.15 
The First Amendment prohibits the government from enacting a law that 
“abridge[s] the freedom of speech,”16 but such a right is not absolute and is 
subject to countervailing interests.17  For example, the government has 
imposed restrictions on speech that may incite imminent lawless action,18 
fighting words,19 speech before a hostile audience,20 obscenity,21 and 
 
1150/ab_1143_bill_20030221_introduced.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). The measure 
passed in the Assembly, but was later abandoned by the state senate. See Complete Bill 
History, OFFICIAL CAL. LEGIS. INFO., http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab
_1101-1150/ab_1143_bill_20041130_history.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).  Georgia 
passed legislation criminalizing the transmission of data under a false name. See GA. CODE 
ANN. § 16-9-93.1 (West 2012).  A federal court in Georgia interpreted this law as a 
restriction on anonymous speech and granted an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of 
the Act.  See ACLU of Ga. v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1235 (N.D. Ga. 1997).  New Jersey 
also considered a bill that would require individuals to register with websites before being 
allowed to post on those websites, significantly undermining the right to anonymity. See 
A.B. 1327, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006), available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/A1500/1327_I1.PDF (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).  
Currently, the New York State legislature is considering the Internet Protection Act, which is 
similar to the New Jersey proposal. See A.B. 8688, 2012 Leg., 235th Sess. (N.Y. 2012), 
available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=%0D%0A&bn=A.8688&term=
2011&Summary=Y&Text=Y (last visited Apr. 19, 2013); see also infra Part I.C.2. 
 13. See Californians Against Sexual Exploitation Act, 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 35, 
§ 12 (West) (to be codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.015(a)(4) (West 2013)), available at 
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2012/general/pdf/text-proposed-laws-v2.pdf#nameddest=prop35; 
GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(16)(K) (West 2008), invalidated by White v. Baker, 696 F. 
Supp. 2d 1289 (N.D. Ga. 2010). 
 14. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 15. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (“A 
fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must 
give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required.”). 
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 17. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT:  CASES, 
COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 2 (5th ed. 2011). 
 18. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that a state 
statute that prohibited speech that advocated violence, rather than the incitement of violence, 
was unconstitutional, because it infringed upon speakers’ right to free speech). 
 19. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).  In Chaplinsky, the Court 
affirmed the conviction of a speaker who violated a state law that prohibited any person from 
addressing offensive, derisive, or annoying words to any other person, because the law was 
not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 574. 
 20. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 318–21 (1951) (upholding the 
constitutionality of a statute that prohibited speech that may cause a breach of the peace 
because the state has the power to prevent the outbreak of violence). 
 21. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982) (affirming constitutionality of 
a state statute that restricted the sale of pornography depicting children because the First 
Amendment does not protect child pornography and the law was not overbroad or vague); 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (holding that states may restrict the sale of 
pornographic “works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which 
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defamation.22  Although anonymous online speech may contain elements of 
speech that may be restricted, it also includes many protected areas of 
speech, including political speech and other expressive activities that may 
not be restricted.  Thus, it is necessary to evaluate the extent to which the 
justifications for restricting speech apply to an online context and how such 
regulation can be shaped to prevent chilling protected elements of 
anonymous speech. 
This Note proceeds in four parts.  Part I discusses U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence relating to speech regulations, civil liability that may curtail 
speech rights, and the history of anonymous speech in traditional contexts.  
Part II explores the arguments for and against strengthening anonymous 
speech rights in an online context.  Part III discusses the various standards 
that courts use when determining whether to grant a subpoena request to 
disclose the identity of an anonymous speaker.  Lastly, Part IV argues that 
courts should require plaintiffs to meet a modified summary judgment 
standard before allowing the disclosure of an anonymous speaker and that 
the legislature should not seek to ban anonymous online speech. 
I.  LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF ANONYMOUS ONLINE SPEECH PROTECTION 
In the United States, the First Amendment protects the right to free 
speech, which is considered a fundamental right.23  Despite the 
Amendment’s broad language that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech,”24 there is a near universal acceptance that 
the right to free speech includes some limits.25  This part discusses the legal 
landscape of anonymous speech.  Part I.A considers the standard of review 
of speech regulations, focusing on defamation and commercial speech.  Part 
I.B then examines the history of anonymous speech regulation. 
A.  Speech Regulation Standards 
The standard of scrutiny that the court applies in determining the 
constitutionality of a law often depends on the type of regulation and its 
 
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”). 
 22. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that states may 
determine the standard for liability for newscasters who make defamatory statements 
regarding private individuals); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) 
(holding that a publisher that makes an honest mistake of fact regarding the conduct of a 
public official cannot be held civilly liable, because the First Amendment protects the free 
discourse of ideas). 
 23. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269–70 (discussing U.S. Supreme Court cases that 
considered the fundamental nature of free speech rights); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 
357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (discussing how the right to free speech is a 
“fundamental principle of the American government”). 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 25. See SHIFFRIN & CHOPER, supra note 17, at 2.  The most common example is that 
there is no right to falsely announce that there is a fire in crowded theater. Id. 
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relationship to the aims of the First Amendment.26  A threshold question is 
whether the regulation seeks to proscribe limits on speech or activity.27  If 
the law seeks to regulate speech, then the court must determine whether the 
legislation discriminates based on the content of the speech, whether the 
legislation is sufficiently specific to give individuals notice of their rights, 
and whether it limits only unprotected areas of speech.28  The standard of 
review that the court applies depends, in part, on the type of regulation.  
This section discusses the standards for content-based regulation, the 
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines, and commercial speech. 
1.  Content-Based Regulations 
Content-based regulations, which prohibit speech based on the ideas or 
subject matter of the speaker’s message, are presumptively unconstitutional 
and subject to strict scrutiny.29  Under the strict scrutiny standard, the 
government must prove that such regulations are narrowly tailored to serve 
a compelling governmental interest.30  The Supreme Court has found that 
the government may restrict “fighting words”31 and words that will incite 
imminent lawless action,32 because the government has a compelling 
interest in maintaining public order and such restrictions do not 
significantly restrict a speaker’s ability to convey a message.33  The 
government, however, does not have a compelling interest in regulating 
speech “in order to maintain what [it] regard[s] as a suitable level of 
discourse within the body politic.”34 
Content-neutral regulations that restrict speech are subject to intermediate 
scrutiny because such regulations are less likely to discriminate against 
certain viewpoints or suppress public dialogue.35  Under intermediate 
 
 26. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (stating that 
there is a narrow presumption of constitutionality when legislation restricts a right protected 
by the first ten amendments). 
 27. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 28. See id. at 376–77. 
 29. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).  Strict scrutiny is a 
standard of review that courts use to evaluate the constitutionality of government action 
when it deprives an individual or group of individuals of a fundamental right. ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 554 (4th ed. 2011).  Strict 
scrutiny requires that the government show it has a compelling interest and that the means 
used are narrowly tailored or necessary to achieve those ends. Id. 
 30. See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395 (finding that an ordinance that regulates speech 
based on the hostility of content was invalid, because it is not narrowly tailored to serve the 
compelling government interest of protecting groups that have been historically subject to 
discrimination). 
 31. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (establishing the 
“fighting words” doctrine under which the government may permissibly proscribe speech 
that may result in a breach of the peace). 
 32. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that 
speech may be regulated if it is reasonably calculated to incite “imminent lawless action and 
is likely to incite or produce such action”). 
 33. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 381; Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
 34. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971). 
 35. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). 
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scrutiny, the government must show that the law is substantially related to 
an important governmental interest.36  While content-neutral regulations 
can be innocent and have a minimal effect on speech, such as through 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions,37 content-neutral laws may 
restrict a broader range of speech than content-based regulations.38  Thus, a 
court is likely to review with greater judicial scrutiny a law that restricts the 
use of all anonymous speech, because it would significantly infringe upon 
speakers’ ability to exercise their First Amendment rights.39 
2.  Doctrines of Overbreadth and Vagueness 
Furthermore, any regulations on speech must be specific and have a 
defined scope.40  A law is unconstitutionally vague when “a reasonable 
person cannot tell what speech is protected and what is permitted.”41  The 
limits must be clearly defined both to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory 
application of the law, and to ensure that individuals have sufficient notice 
of their rights.42  The overbreadth doctrine is used to invalidate laws that 
impose greater restrictions than are constitutionally permissible.43  These 
doctrines are particularly relevant in the context of anonymous speech 
regulation because the regulations must be specific enough to avoid 
restricting protected speech while being clear enough to give individuals 
notice of the permissible bounds of their rights.44 
3.  Commercial Speech Regulation 
Commercial speech is entitled to less protection than other forms of 
speech.45  The Supreme Court laid out the test for regulating commercial 
speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
 
 36. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3:2 (3d 
ed. 1996). 
 37. See id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id.; see also Sharkey’s, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 265 F. Supp. 2d 984, 994 
(E.D. Wis. 2003) (holding that content neutral laws “by no means receive a free pass under 
the First Amendment” (quoting Clarkson v. Town of Florence, 198 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1006 
(E.D. Wis. 2002))). 
 40. See SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 6:2. 
 41. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 970. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. at 972; see also SMOLLA, supra note 36, §§ 6:3–6:4. 
 44. See SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 6:13.  The doctrine of vagueness is not unique to 
speech regulation; it also applies in criminal law and for any deprivation of a constitutional 
liberty. See id.; see also United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (“Vagueness 
doctrine is an outgrowth not of the First Amendment, but of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.”); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393 (1926) (“The dividing 
line between what is lawful and unlawful cannot be left to conjecture.” (quoting United 
States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App. D.C. 592, 598 (1910))). 
 45. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Gas Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 
(1980) (“The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to 
other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”). 
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Commission.46  While there is no clear definition of commercial speech, 
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky describes commercial speech as a type of 
advertisement that refers to a specific product and was made with an 
economic motivation.47  Under this standard, speech may be limited or 
proscribed if the speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading, 
there is a substantial government interest, the regulation directly advances 
the government interest, and the regulation is narrowly tailored.48  The 
Central Hudson test has since been modified, and now—although 
ostensibly still intermediate level review—it more closely resembles strict 
scrutiny.49 
Courts have not yet developed a clear standard for identifying when 
anonymous online speech is commercial.50  In some cases, courts have 
found anonymous speech that interferes with business practices or involves 
copyright infringement to constitute commercial speech.51  In other cases, 
courts have found anonymous speech to be purely expressive and therefore 
not considered commercial speech.52  Whether the classification of speech 
is relevant to determining the appropriate level of protection that courts and 
legislatures should afford speech will be discussed below.53 
B.  Speech Torts 
Although the Constitution restricts the ability of the government to 
regulate speech, speakers may be held liable for the consequences of their 
speech in private actions.  Speech may give rise to tort actions for 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 1125; see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. 
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983) (finding a pamphlet to constitute commercial speech 
because it was an advertisement, referred to a single product, and the speaker had an 
economic motivation for the speech, but noting that any individual factor was not 
dispositive). 
 48. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co., 447 U.S. at 566. 
 49. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002) (finding that a 
federal law restricting the ability of drug providers to advertise their drugs was 
unconstitutional because the government did not have a sufficient interest in regulating 
commercial speech in that context); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 562–66 
(2001) (stating that strict scrutiny did not apply to a law restricting commercial speech, but 
conducting a thorough analysis of the state’s justification to find the law unconstitutional); 
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183–88 (1999); 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996) (noting that a prohibition on 
speech unrelated to consumer protection must be reviewed with “special care”). 
 50. Cf. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We 
need not, however, decide if the speech at issue here constitutes commercial speech under 
the Supreme Court’s definition in Central Hudson.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 558, 562–63 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (analyzing a copyright infringement claim where there was a low speech 
interest). 
 52. E.g., Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2001) (rejecting a subpoena request for an anonymous commenters’ identity, because the 
plaintiff failed to show harm from an allegedly defamatory comment, and allowing the 
discovery would chill the commenter’s speech rights). 
 53. See infra Part IV. 
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defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  This part discusses these speech torts and their applicability to 
online speech. 
1.  Defamation 
Defamation is a tort that allows a plaintiff to bring a civil action to 
recover damages when he suffers reputational harm due to a defendant’s 
speech.54  Defamation includes the torts of libel, which occurs when the 
speech is written, and slander, which occurs when the speech is spoken.55  
To prove defamation at common law, the plaintiff must show that the 
defendant made a false, defamatory comment regarding the plaintiff and 
that the comment was published.56  A defamatory comment is one that 
injures the plaintiff’s reputation or diminishes “the esteem, respect, good-
will or confidence in which the plaintiff is held.”57 
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,58 the Supreme Court added a mens 
rea element that requires plaintiffs to prove that that the publisher acted 
“with actual malice” when making a statement about a public official.59  
This requirement means that the publisher knew the falsity of his statement 
or acted recklessly with regard to the truth.60  However, a speaker who 
expresses an opinion, as determined by a court, cannot be held liable for 
defamation.61  Although Sullivan applied only when the plaintiff was a 
public official and the defamatory comment related to his or her official 
conduct, the Court has extended the rule to apply to all public figures.62 
Defamation is more likely to occur online than in print because there is 
less editorial oversight in online speech and because online speakers are not 
bound to the same professional and social mores that restrict journalists’ 
and identified speakers’ practices.63  Defamation in an online context can 
be difficult to prosecute because in many cases it is obvious that the 
individual speaker is expressing his or her opinion rather than making a 
 
 54. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 1078; see also Ryan M. Martin, Freezing the Net:  
Rejecting a One-Size-Fits-All Standard for Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers in 
Defamation Lawsuits, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1217, 1225–27 (2007). 
 55. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 771 (5th ed. 1984).  Libel 
originated as a crime, while slander could only be brought as a criminal action in conjunction 
with another offense, such as sedition, blasphemy, or a breach of the peace. Id. at 785; see 
also Susan W. Brenner, Should Online Defamation Be Criminalized?, 76 MISS. L.J. 705, 
709–14 (2007) (discussing the history of defamation law from its common law origins). 
 56. See, e.g., 19 AM. JUR. Trials § 499 (2012); 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 87 (2012). 
 57. KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, at 773. 
 58. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 59. Id. at 279–80. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977); see also KEETON ET AL., supra 
note 55, at 839–40. 
 62. See Curtis Publ’g. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155–56 (1967) (noting that the 
similarities in libel actions against public officials and public figures provided a basis for 
applying the Sullivan standard to public figures). 
 63. See Brenner, supra note 55, at 741–42 (discussing how print publishing undergoes a 
filtering process, whereas online publishing does not). 
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statement of fact.64  For example, in Doe v. Cahill, the court found that 
readers of a news website would not take seriously comments that criticized 
a public official’s performance as a city councilman, because readers would 
understand the comments to be opinion.65  Given the generally informal 
nature of the internet, it is possible that a broad reading of “opinion” will 
hinder plaintiffs’ ability to bring successful defamation claims.66 
2.  Invasion of Privacy 
Privacy torts may also lawfully restrict speech rights.67  These torts stem 
from a general right to privacy, which Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis 
characterized as a “general right of the individual to be let alone.”68  
Warren and Brandeis derived this right from the torts of defamation, 
invasion of property rights, and breach of implied contract.69  The privacy 
torts include unreasonable intrusion, public disclosure of private facts, false 
light, and appropriation.70  This section will discuss these torts and their 
relationship to speech rights. 
a.  Unreasonable Intrusion 
The right to privacy protects an individual’s right to be protected from 
unreasonable or offensive intrusion into her private affairs and concerns.71  
This right protects both physical privacy72 and other intrusions, such as the 
prohibition on eavesdropping, restrictions on persistent, unwanted 
telephone calls, and prying into some forms of personal records.73  The 
Second Restatement of Torts states that an individual will be liable for 
unreasonable intrusion if he intentionally intruded upon the solicitude or 
 
 64. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 466 (Del. 2005) (“[A] reasonable person reading a 
newspaper in print or online, for example, can assume that the statements are factually based 
and researched.  This is not the case when the statements are made on blogs or in chat 
rooms.”). 
 65. Id. at 465. 
 66. S. Elizabeth Malloy, Anonymous Blogging and Defamation:  Balancing Interests on 
the Internet, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1187, 1190–91 (2006). 
 67. The right to privacy from governmental intrusion developed in the line of cases 
started by Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), is conceptually distinct from the 
right discussed in this Note. 
 68. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
205 (1890). 
 69. Id. at 193–95. 
 70. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960); see also 
Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 8–9 (2007) (noting that Prosser’s four categories of privacy torts have been 
incorporated into modern American jurisprudence); Maayan Y. Vodovis, Note, Look over 
Your Figurative Shoulder:  How To Save Individual Dignity and Privacy on the Internet, 40 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 816–17 (2012) (noting that there are four recognized categories of 
privacy torts at common law). 
 71. KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, at 854. 
 72. The right to physical privacy includes the right to physical solitude, seclusion, and 
protection of the home. Id. 
 73. Id. at 854–55. 
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seclusion of another and the intrusion is highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.74  While this tort is used in the internet context primarily to prevent 
information gathering that reasonable people would find offensive, it is also 
relevant to the concept of anonymous online speech.75  An individual may 
have a claim against a speaker who publicizes a private fact that does not 
have public concern and the disclosure of which a reasonable person would 
find offensive.76  
b.  Public Disclosure of Private Facts 
Another category of privacy torts that is relevant in an online context is 
public disclosure of private facts.  The exact requirements of the 
information that must be disclosed and the circumstances of the disclosure 
are debated.77  For example, Prosser argues that to recover damages, a 
plaintiff must prove public disclosure of private facts that would be “highly 
offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary 
sensibilities.”78  The Second Restatement includes an additional 
requirement that there is no public interest in the disclosure of the 
information.79  Professor Hill, on the other hand, advocates for a more 
nuanced test that balances the extent of the disclosure with the character of 
the material that is disclosed.80  All standards, however, agree that the 
disclosure must be “highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable 
person of ordinary sensibilities.”81 
This tort reflects the tension between a speaker’s First Amendment right 
to anonymous speech and others’ common law rights and informational 
privacy interests.82  While some commentators suggest that online speech 
should be given greater protection despite its sometimes offensive nature,83 
courts have generally applied a consistent standard to online- and offline-
 
 74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
 75. See Vodovis, supra note 70, at 817. 
 76. See Abril, supra note 70, at 9. 
 77. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d, with Alfred Hill, 
Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1258–62 
(1976).  For a modern assessment of Professor Hill’s disagreement with the Second 
Restatement’s approach, see Robert D. Sack, Protection of Opinion Under the First 
Amendment:  Reflections on Alfred Hill, “Defamation and Privacy Under the First 
Amendment,” 100 COLUM. L. REV. 294, 310–13 (2000). 
 78. KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, at 856–57. 
 79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d. 
 80. See Hill, supra note 77, at 1258–62. 
 81. KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, at 856–57.  Public figures, however, have a 
diminished right of privacy. Id. at 859–60. 
 82. Anita L. Allen, Privacy Jurisprudence As an Instrument of Social Change:  First 
Amendment Privacy and the Battle for Progressively Liberal Social Change, 14 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 885, 920–21 (2012). 
 83. See id. at 924–25; cf. Amy Pomerantz Nickerson, Comment, Coercive Discovery 
and the First Amendment:  Towards a Heightened Discoverability Standard, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 841, 869–70 (2010) (suggesting that there should be a heightened standard before 
allowing discovery of speech-related activities). 
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speech torts.84  Such consistent treatment, however, may be problematic 
because anonymous online speech may pose unique harms, as discussed 
below in Part II.B.85 
c.  False Light 
False light in the public eye occurs when an individual’s speech or 
conduct characterizes another in an untrue manner or is deceptive.86  This 
may, for example, include attributing articles or opinions to the speaker, 
unauthorized use of another’s name on a petition, or filing suit on behalf of 
another.87  As with defamation, in a false light claim the plaintiff must 
prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that the facts were wrong or 
acted with reckless disregard for the truth.88  Unlike defamation, however, 
some states do not require the plaintiff to prove that there was an injury to 
his reputation.89  Frequently, statements that give rise to a false light claim 
may be defamatory and give rise to an action for libel or slander.90  
Nevertheless, the two actions protect different interests.91  Defamation 
actions protect an individual’s reputation, while false light actions protect 
the plaintiff’s right to be left alone.92 
d.  Appropriation 
Appropriation occurs when a defendant uses the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness for the defendant’s advantage or benefit.93  Merely using another’s 
name or publishing some aspects of another’s person or property is 
insufficient unless it identifies a specific individual who can be recognized 
by others.94  Appropriation may conflict with the First Amendment when an 
individual wants to use an image or likeness for disseminating the news or 
 
 84. See Allen, supra note 82, at 924–25 (“[Courts] have tended to view speech that 
would be tortious off line as tortious online.”). 
 85. See also Abril, supra note 70, at 28 (suggesting a new analysis for the public 
disclosure tort in the online context); Malloy, supra note 66, at 1192–93 (discussing how 
online speech is more harmful than traditional modes of speech). 
 86. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, at 863.  The statement, however, does not 
necessarily need to be something negative about the plaintiff and can even involve 
statements that falsely enhance the plaintiff’s reputation. See SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 24:3. 
 87. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, at 863–64. 
 88. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1967). 
 89. See SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 24:3. 
 90. See Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2002) (allowing the 
plaintiff to maintain both false light and defamation claims); KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, 
at 864. But see Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1113–15 (Fla. 2008) (holding 
that Florida does not recognize a false light invasion of privacy tort because the overlap with 
defamation is too great). 
 91. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, at 864. 
 92. See id.; SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 24:3. 
 93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977); see also KEETON ET AL., 
supra note 55, at 851; SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 24:4. 
 94. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, at 852–53. 
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for publicity.95  Appropriation oftentimes occurs in cases of copyright 
infringement—and thus courts may give such speech less protection than 
they gives to other forms of speech96—but the Supreme Court has held that 
the First Amendment may protect some forms of appropriation.97 
3.  Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
The tort for the infliction of emotional distress developed from a 
recognition that, in some cases, speech could cause significant injury.98  
Although the tort originated from cases where the mental distress was 
associated with another tort, such as assault, battery, or false 
imprisonment,99 courts created an independent action for purely mental 
distress.100  An intentional infliction of emotional distress claim requires the 
plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, the 
conduct was extreme and outrageous, and it caused the plaintiff to suffer 
distress that no reasonable person could be expected to endure.101  In these 
cases, the injury must be significant; a plaintiff cannot recover against mere 
insults, indignity, annoyance, threats, or rough language.102  Although 
intentional infliction of emotional distress oftentimes may arise from 
speech, Professor Smolla argues that courts should not mischaracterize 
defamation or invasion of privacy claims as intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, because it would disrupt the First Amendment balances 
inherent in defamation or invasion of privacy claims.103 
C.  Anonymous Speech Regulation 
As with all other forms of speech, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
the right to anonymous speech is not absolute.  This part considers the 
development of the right to anonymous speech and the areas in which the 
Court has curtailed the right to anonymous speech. 
 
 95. See Ann-Margret v. High Soc’y Magazine, 498 F. Supp. 401, 404–06 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980) (finding that the right to free speech transcends the right to privacy where a defendant 
used an image of the plaintiff that had appeared in a popular movie); SMOLLA, supra note 36, 
§ 24:4. 
 96. Cf. SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 24:4. 
 97. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576–78 (1977) (holding 
that a plaintiff, whose performance was recorded and replayed on the news without his 
consent, may maintain an action against the broadcasting company, but noting that there are 
some cases in which the First Amendment would protect appropriation). 
 98. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, at 56–57. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Wilkinson v. Downton, (1897) 2 Q.B. 57 (Eng.) (allowing a plaintiff, who 
suffered serious mental and physical consequences after falsely being told that her husband 
had been harmed in an accident, to recover against the speaker). 
 101. See SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 24:8. 
 102. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, at 59. 
 103. See SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 24:8. 
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1.  Legal Support for Anonymous Speech Rights 
Individuals in the United States have been exercising their right to speak 
anonymously since the time of the nation’s founding.104  The Supreme 
Court cited the history and importance of anonymous speech—particularly 
in the context of political speech—in Talley v. California,105 in which the 
Court held unconstitutional a city ordinance that prohibited the distribution 
of anonymously printed handbills.106  In Talley, the State argued that the 
restriction was not content based and was aimed at furthering a compelling 
government interest—preventing fraud, false advertising, and libel.107  The 
Court held that while these were valid purposes, the ordinance was 
unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored to serve those ends as 
the ordinance was overbroad and would proscribe protected areas of 
speech.108  The Court instead suggested that regulations specifically 
addressing fraudulent speech, false advertising, and libel would be more 
likely to be found constitutional.109 
The Supreme Court expanded the protections for anonymous speech in 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,110 when it held unconstitutional a 
state law prohibiting the distribution of campaign literature that did not 
contain the name and address of the individual or organization issuing the 
literature.111  The Ohio Supreme Court had distinguished McIntyre from 
Talley on the grounds that the Ohio regulation at issue in McIntyre was 
limited to speech that was “designed to influence voters in an election,”112 
whereas the California ordinance in Talley restricted any distribution of 
anonymous pamphlets.113  The Court held that there was a strong interest in 
allowing anonymous political speech and that this provision should be 
subject to exacting—or strict—scrutiny because it was content based and 
involved an infringement on political expression.114  In the Court’s opinion, 
this was a standard that the State failed to meet.115 
The Supreme Court has also recognized the right of anonymity in the 
context of the right to freedom of association.116  In NAACP v. Alabama ex 
 
 104. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 105. 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
 106. Id. at 64–65. 
 107. See id. at 64. 
 108. Id. at 62–64. 
 109. Id. at 64. 
 110. 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (“[A]n author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other 
decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of 
the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.”). 
 111. Id. at 357. 
 112. Id. at 344. 
 113. See id. 
 114. Id. at 346 (citing Meyer v. Grant, 386 U.S. 414, 420 (1988)). 
 115. Id. at 357.  The Supreme Court affirmed the right to anonymous speech more 
recently in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002), 
when it struck down a law that prohibited individuals from going door-to-door, finding that 
the law may chill ordinary neighborly conduct. 
 116. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
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rel. Patterson,117 the Supreme Court held that the government may not 
compel organizations to disclose the identities of their members because it 
may restrain members’ freedom of association.118  Although not directly 
applicable to the issue of anonymous speech, this case establishes that 
anonymity is a right that may be necessary to protect other fundamental 
rights. 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of 
anonymous speech rights in an online context, the Court has held that 
traditional First Amendment rights apply online.119  In the case In re 
Anonymous Online Speakers,120 the Ninth Circuit needed to determine 
whether a plaintiff could obtain a subpoena to reveal the identity of 
anonymous commenters who had been accused of tortiously interfering 
with the plaintiff’s business by launching a smear campaign.121  The court 
held that online speech “stands on the same footing as other speech—there 
is ‘no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should 
be applied’ to online speech.”122  Nevertheless, the court found that the 
anonymous online speakers’ identities could be disclosed because their 
speech was not political speech and thus was subject to a lower level of 
protection.123 
2.  Regulation of Anonymous Speech 
The Court has curtailed the right to anonymous speech through 
disclosure requirements in campaign finance laws that require individuals to 
disclose the amount of money they have contributed to political parties or 
candidate’s campaigns.  In Buckley v. Valeo,124 the Supreme Court 
reviewed the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971 and the 1974 amendments.125  The Act imposed a maximum 
contribution limit and required disclosures of contributions and 
expenditures over a certain threshold.126  Challengers of the Act argued that 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 462. 
 119. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870–72 (1997) (applying constitutional 
protections to invalidate a portion of the Communications Decency Act that prohibited 
indecent communications because the Act was not content neutral). 
 120. 661 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 121. Id. at 1172–73. 
 122. Id. at 1173 (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 870). 
 123. Id.  See infra Part III.A for a discussion of the standards used by various courts in 
deciding whether to issue a subpoena to reveal the identity of an anonymous online 
commenter. 
 124. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 125. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, as amended 
by the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 
1263 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). 
 126. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f) (2006).  The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 created the 
Federal Election Commission and requires candidates and political committees to disclose 
their contributions, id. § 434, limits the contributions individuals can make to candidates, id. 
§ 441a(a), imposes caps on presidential candidates’ expenditures, id. § 441a(b), and imposes 
other caps on election spending, id. § 441a(a). 
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the law restricted individuals’ First Amendment rights, because campaign 
contributions are a form of expression and allow individuals to show 
support for a certain candidate or issue.127  The challengers also argued that 
the disclosure requirements infringed upon their freedom of association.128  
The Court, however, rejected these arguments, finding that, although 
donations are a form of expression and restrictions on them may infringe 
upon some speech rights, the restrictions did not undermine the ability of 
citizens to engage in meaningful debate about the candidates and the 
relevant issues.129  The Court also found that the disclosure requirements 
did not violate individuals’ First Amendment rights because the government 
was able to show that the disclosure served a legitimate governmental 
interest in maintaining the integrity of the political process, deterring 
corruption, and enforcing the caps on independent expenditure limits.130 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the government’s ability to require 
disclosure in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission.131  In one 
issue determined in Citizens United, the Court determined that the 
disclaimer and disclosure requirements of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act132 did not violate the First Amendment because, although the 
requirements may burden speech, they did not prevent speakers from 
conveying their message.133  However, the Court found that the regulation 
suppressing political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate 
identity134 and barring independent corporate expenditures violated the First 
Amendment.135  In contrast, the Court upheld the disclaimer and disclosure 
requirements because it determined that the government’s interest in 
providing the electorate with necessary information to make informed 
decisions justified the burden it imposed on speech.136 
II.  LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ANONYMOUS                            
ONLINE-SPEECH PROTECTIONS 
Although the right to anonymous speech is not absolute, the reasons for 
restricting anonymous speech—such as those advanced in Buckley and 
Citizens United—may not be applicable to anonymous online speech 
because the same countervailing justifications for restrictions may not be 
present.  The Supreme Court has specifically held that Buckley does not 
 
 127. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14. 
 128. Id. at 11. 
 129. See id. at 29. 
 130. Id. at 66–69. 
 131. 130 S. Ct. 876, 913–15 (2010). 
 132. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 2 U.S.C and 36 U.S.C.).  This Act amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
and imposed limits on soft money contributions, increased contribution limits for state 
committees of political parties, and imposed reporting requirements on independent 
expenditures, among other things. Id. 
 133. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913–14. 
 134. Id. at 913. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 914. 
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operate to restrict anonymous speech rights in other contexts because the 
justification in Buckley was limited to avoiding the appearance of 
corruption and to enforce campaign finance restrictions.137 
To determine the degree of protection that courts should afford 
anonymous online speakers, it is necessary to examine the justifications for 
protecting free speech.  Part II.A discusses the historic justifications for free 
speech protection, focusing on the importance of anonymous speech.  Part 
II.B explores the countervailing justifications for restricting anonymous 
speech. 
A.  Rationales for Protecting Anonymous Online Speech 
Historically, speech has been protected because it promotes the free 
exchange of ideas, which is necessary to discover the truth,138 self-govern, 
check governmental power, and protect individual autonomy and 
liberties.139  These same concerns apply to speech on the internet and can 
be used to justify extending First Amendment protections to anonymous 
online speakers.140  The internet represents a new medium of 
communication and anonymous bloggers may be considered “the modern-
day equivalent of the revolutionary pamphleteer who passed out news 
bulletins on the street corner.”141  As such, commentators argue that those 
speakers should not be required to disclose their identities unless the 
plaintiffs can show that they may have a legitimate claim against the 
speaker.142  Courts and commentators agree that anonymous online speech 
should be protected because the values inherent in promoting free speech 
continue to apply in an online context,143 the justifications that exist for 
restricting anonymous speech in other contexts144 do not apply to online 
 
 137. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 354 (1995) (“Required 
disclosures about the level of financial support a candidate has received from various sources 
are supported by an interest in avoiding the appearance of corruption that has no application 
to this case.”). 
 138. The truth-seeking function of speech, or the notion of a “market place of ideas,” 
derives from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 139. See Nickerson, supra note 83, at 869–70. 
 140. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (extending First Amendment 
protection to online speech). 
 141. David L. Hudson, Jr., Blogs and the First Amendment, 11 NEXUS 129, 131 (2006) 
(quoting Sen. John Cornyn) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Daniel J. Solove, A 
Tale of Two Bloggers:  Free Speech and Privacy in the Blogosphere, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1195, 1196 (2006) (discussing Glenn Reynolds’s assertion that modern bloggers may 
supplement and challenge traditional media coverage). 
 142. Jocelyn Hanamirian, Note, The Right To Remain Anonymous:  Anonymous Speakers, 
Confidential Sources and the Public Good, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 119, 119 (2011); 
Hudson, supra note 141, at 132. 
 143. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 870 (holding that there is “no basis for qualifying the level of 
First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the internet]”). 
 144. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 354 (1995). 
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speech, and the government should protect speakers’ legitimate 
expectations of privacy.145 
Although Buckley v. Valeo upheld disclosure requirements, at least one 
scholar has suggested that courts reconsider the disclosure requirement in 
light of technological developments and increased concern for privacy.146  
Professor Amy Sanders argues that anonymous commenters have an 
expectation of privacy that should not be defeated unless there is a 
compelling reason or unless the commenter agreed to disclosure when 
posting on the website.147  Courts recognize that if government actions 
diminish speakers’ expectations of privacy, speakers are more likely to 
restrain their speech, thereby resulting in a chilling effect that deprives 
individuals of their rights to speak anonymously.148 
Proponents of broad speech protection argue that anonymous speech 
helps promote the truth-seeking function by allowing individuals to express 
themselves without fear that they may be harassed, socially ostracized, or 
that they may lose their jobs.149  Furthermore, they argue, anonymity helps 
ensure that the merits or value of the speaker’s message is not discounted, 
stereotyped, or prejudged on the basis of the speaker’s characteristics.150  
Commentator Mike Godwin notes that online speech and the internet can 
 
 145. See Nathaniel Gleicher, John Doe Subpoenas:  Towards a Consistent Legal 
Standard, 118 YALE L.J. 320, 360–61 (2008) (discussing how various courts have inquired 
into the defendant’s expectation of privacy). Compare Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1–
40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that the court should consider the 
parties’ expectation of privacy when deciding whether to allow discovery of identifiable 
information from an ISP), with Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 762 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (looking to a website’s privacy policy to determine whether 
defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 146. William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntryre’s Checkbook:  Privacy Costs of Political 
Contribution Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 7 (2003). 
 147. Amy Kristin Sanders & Patrick C. File, Giving Users a Plain Deal:  Contract-
Related Media Liability for Unmasking Anonymous Commenters, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 197, 
207–08 (2011). 
 148. See White v. Baker, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1310–11 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (holding that a 
law that would require the plaintiff to disclose his online identity would chill his right to 
anonymous online speech); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 462 (Del. 2005) (“[A]llowing a 
defamation plaintiff to unmask an anonymous defendant’s identity through the judicial 
process is a crucial form of relief that if too easily obtained will chill the exercise of First 
Amendment rights to free speech.”). But see Clay Calvert et al., David Doe v. Goliath, Inc.:  
Judicial Ferment in 2009 for Business Plaintiffs Seeking the Identities of Anonymous Online 
Speakers, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 15 (2009) (discussing how the internet can be harmful 
when abused by anonymous speakers). 
 149. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and 
Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1570–74 (2007); Nickerson, supra note 
83, at 847–48. 
 150. See Brenner, supra note 55, at 743–44 (“[T]he less we know about the author of 
online content, the more difficult it is for us to assess the merits of what she says.”); Martin, 
supra note 54, at 1220 (citing IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW:  TREATISE 
WITH FORMS § 1:06 (2004)). 
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help promote pluralism by allowing individuals to reach a broader 
audience.151 
Proponents of free speech note that broad speech rights provide a check 
on government power because they allow citizens to voice their grievances 
or note when public officials behave in a manner that is unacceptable to 
their constituents.152  Anonymous speech advances that interest by allowing 
citizens to voice their concern without fear of direct or indirect reprisal.153  
Furthermore, protecting the privacy interests of anonymous speakers helps 
to advance their individual autonomy by “enabling people to engage in 
unconventional activities and express unpopular ideas without fear of 
retaliation.”154  The ability of individuals to express their opinions and inner 
thoughts may give those individuals a sense of intrinsic satisfaction because 
they can explore new ideas and new identities.155 
In balancing the interests between speakers and those who may be 
harmed by speech, commentators have argued that the government should 
take a pragmatic approach by offering greater protection to the speakers and 
allowing individual companies or website administrators to take 
responsibility for restricting such speech.156  Since website 
administrators—as nongovernmental actors—are not bound by First 
Amendment limitations, they may be in a better position to vindicate the 
rights of those who might be harmed by anonymous speech.157  As 
discussed below, however, such an approach may lead to other significant 
problems.158 
 
 151. See MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS:  DEFENDING FREE SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
298 (1998) (discussing how the rise in internet speech can lead to “radical pluralism”). 
 152. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 542 (1977).  The role of anonymous online speech in promoting 
democracy may be best illustrated through the use of social media in recent uprisings in Iran 
and Egypt. See, e.g., Nassim Nazemi, Note, DCMA § 512 Safe Harbor for Anonymity 
Networks Amid a Cyber-Democratic Storm:  Lessons from the 2009 Iranian Uprising, 
106 NW. U. L. REV. 855, 866–67 (2012) (“[A]rrests [for posting on social media] helped 
shine a floodlight on the importance of unfiltered Internet access and online anonymity to 
U.S. democratization efforts abroad and U.S. access to world news . . . .”). 
 153. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 141, at 1199. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 149, at 1568–69. 
 156. Id. at 1577, 1582–86 (arguing that there is a fundamental assumption that audiences 
of speech are rational and capable of self-governance, and that the Supreme Court’s decision 
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), is an example of this assumption). 
 157. For example, The New York Times allows anonymous or pseudonymous comments 
on its website but requires users to register their email addresses and reserves the right to 
moderate or remove comments. See Comments & Readers’ Reviews, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/content/help/site/usercontent/usercontent.html (last visited Apr. 19, 
2013).  Other websites may require the individual to sign in with a social media account, 
such as Facebook or Twitter. See Comments and Discussion, WASH. POST, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/interactivity/policy/discussion_faq.html (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2013) (allowing commenters to post through either social media applications or a 
registration system).  
 158. See infra notes 349–52 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Rationales for Restricting Anonymous Online Speech 
Despite the compelling reasons for allowing anonymous online speech, 
there are nonetheless strong arguments for restricting such speech.  First, 
protecting anonymous online speech may not advance traditional free-
speech goals because it is not the type of speech that the Supreme Court 
contemplated in Talley and McIntyre.  Second, ubiquitous anonymous 
speech may actually restrict the free discourse of ideas.  Third, it may 
increase antisocial behavior that adversely impacts minority groups.159  
Scholars cite to these countervailing interests to suggest that the 
government should adopt lower protections for anonymous online 
speech.160 
Although the values underlying speech are to discover truth, promote 
self-governance, and promote individual liberty, in practice, commentators 
note that most anonymous online speech has low speech value and is thus 
entitled to lesser protection.161  A narrow reading of Talley and McIntyre 
suggests that the Supreme Court was protecting political privacy rather than 
creating a broad right to anonymity.162  Anonymous online speech, by 
contrast, includes a broader range of speech that may not be political in 
nature or promote self-governance and democratic principles.163  Professor 
James Gardner argues that anonymity allows individuals to act 
disingenuously and to escape accountability for their actions and opinions, 
which is antithetical to a healthy political system.164  As such, the interests 
of others who may be harmed by anonymous online speech justify certain 
restrictions on anonymous speech.165 
Professor James Gardner points out that anonymous online speech may 
not help promote the free discourse of ideas because internet forums tend to 
attract like-minded individuals, which may merely reinforce individuals’ 
comments and beliefs.166  This group polarization can hinder the free 
discourse of ideas and inhibit the truth-seeking function of speech because 
individuals with competing viewpoints are not directly engaging with one 
 
 159. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 64 (2009) 
(discussing the growth of anonymous online mobs that attack minority groups); Michael L. 
Siegel, Comment, Hate Speech, Civil Rights, and the Internet:  The Jurisdictional and 
Human Rights Nightmare, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 375, 381 (1999) (discussing how hate 
groups have used the internet to spread their message). 
 160. See Gleicher, supra note 145, at 330–31 (discussing how the problems with online 
harassment of minority groups complicate traditional speech analysis). 
 161. See Malloy, supra note 66, at 1190–91 (discussing how some online speakers are 
careless and irresponsible); Solove, supra note 141, at 1196–97 (comparing different types 
of bloggers and concluding that most blogs have low value). 
 162. See Calvert et al., supra note 148, at 11–13. 
 163. See id. (suggesting that the right to anonymous speech should be limited to political 
speech, which was at issue in the relevant Supreme Court precedent). 
 164. James A. Gardner, Anonymity and Democratic Citizenship, 19 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 927, 940–41 (2011) (citing John Stuart Mill’s opposition to the secret ballot and 
anonymous speech in a political system). 
 165. See GODWIN, supra note 151, at 299 (discussing the rationality of the fear that an 
anonymous commenter may leave a victim with a damaged reputation and no remedy). 
 166. Gardner, supra note 164, at 945. 
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another in an attempt to persuade others or to discover the truth, but rather 
merely espousing similar views.167  Because empirical evidence suggests 
that anonymity may increase antisocial behavior, Professor Gardner 
suggests that deterring some speech may in fact be desirable.168 
Moreover, Professor Danielle Citron argues, the rights of anonymous 
online speakers should be curtailed to the extent that those rights conflict 
with those of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.169  Those in favor of 
broad speech protection for anonymous online speakers argue that 
anonymity protects individuals from being harassed for their opinions.170  
However, Professor Citron notes that those advocates fail to recognize that 
the internet has become a “breeding ground[]” for intolerant and extremist 
groups.171  These anonymous speakers attack members of traditionally 
disadvantaged groups and can escape reprisal through their anonymity.172  
Although current First Amendment jurisprudence does not permit the 
government to impose categorical prohibitions on hate speech,173 
anonymity precludes speakers from the scrutiny and social sanctions that 
they would face if they made the speech in person.174  Protecting those who 
might be injured by harmful speech provides justifications for adopting a 
flexible disclosure standard for anonymous speakers.175 
Additionally, Professor Daniel Solove suggests that anonymous speech 
rights should be curtailed because they often infringe upon the privacy 
rights of others.176  Although speech that is of public concern is given a 
great deal of protection, private speech—like gossip—is given much less 
protection.177  Professor Solove argues that anonymous internet speech 
should get less protection because it often relates to private concerns.178  
Professor Citron posits that restricting the right of private-concern speech 
will improve the exchange of ideas and promote political, social, and 
economic equality.179  When speakers attack and inspire a sense of fear in 
others based on issues of private concern, Professor Citron believes that 
 
 167. See id. at 930. 
 168. Id. at 947. 
 169. See Citron, supra note 159, at 93–95 (discussing the role of anonymity in civil rights 
abuses). 
 170. See, e.g., Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 149, at 1570–73; Martin, supra note 54, at 
1220; Nickerson, supra note 83, at 847–48. 
 171. Citron, supra note 159, at 62, 69–81. 
 172. See id. at 66 (discussing how the structure of the internet allows individuals to 
escape social stigma for abusive acts). 
 173. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992) (holding a city 
ordinance that prohibited bias-motivated disorderly conduct facially unconstitutional, 
because it was a content-based regulation of a category of speech that was not otherwise 
subject to regulation, such as fighting words). 
 174. See Brenner, supra note 55, at 745 (discussing how anonymity allows individuals to 
engage in antisocial behaviors). 
 175. See Calvert et al., supra note 148, at 14–15; Citron, supra note 159, at 94. 
 176. Solove, supra note 141, at 1198–99. 
 177. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776–77 (1978). 
 178. Solove, supra note 141, at 1198. 
 179. Citron, supra note 159, at 99–104. 
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those victims are more likely to leave the online forum than to use 
additional speech to challenge the attackers’ position, contradicting the 
underlying premise of the truth-seeking rationale of free speech.180 
Finally, anonymous speech increases search costs.181  When individuals 
are associated with their ideas, it helps the public to evaluate the veracity of 
those messages and to learn of the speakers’ potential biases, allowing the 
public to make more informed decisions as to whether to accept the 
speaker’s message.182  Although the public may learn of these 
circumstances or biases through other mechanisms, knowing the speaker’s 
identity helps lower search costs, making it easier to reach a determination 
regarding the truthfulness or accuracy of a statement.183 
III.  CURRENT SPEECH REGULATIONS 
Courts and legislatures have both recognized the tension between 
protecting anonymous speech rights and guarding against the dangers of 
unrestricted anonymous online speech.  Courts have had to determine 
whether to grant plaintiff subpoena requests seeking to identify allegedly 
tortious anonymous speakers.  Meanwhile, several state legislatures have 
passed or attempted to enact legislation that would ban or restrict 
anonymous online-speech rights.  Part III.A discusses the various standards 
that courts have adopted for granting such subpoena requests.  Part III.B 
considers the various laws that state legislatures have proposed to ban or 
restrict anonymous online speech. 
A.  Subpoena Standards for Identity Disclosure 
Courts today are faced with the task of determining the appropriate level 
of protection for anonymous speakers accused of tortious speech.  Speakers 
can communicate anonymously on the internet in a variety of fora, 
including blogs, chat rooms, message boards, and websites.184  Under the 
Communications Decency Act,185 the Internet Service Provider (ISP) or 
website host is not considered to be the speaker or publisher of any material 
 
 180. Id. at 101. 
 181. See Brenner, supra note 55, at 743–44. 
 182. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 382–83 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (discussing how allowing anonymous speech makes it easier for people to be 
untruthful, thus making it more difficult for voters to discover the truth); Amy Constantine, 
Note, What’s in a Name? McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission:  An Examination of the 
Protection Afforded to Anonymous Political Speech, 29 CONN. L. REV. 459, 469–70 (1996). 
 183. See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 149, at 1565–66 (analogizing trademarks to 
authorial identity to demonstrate that individuals may rely on the author’s reputation as a 
proxy for the statement’s reliability). 
 184. Susanna Moore, The Challenge of Internet Anonymity:  Protecting John Doe on the 
Internet, 26 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 469, 470 (2009).  Situations in which 
speakers identify themselves, such as through social media, are beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
 185. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified at 
47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 560–61). 
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that was provided by another user.186  Thus, they cannot be held civilly 
liable for “violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable” material, 
regardless of whether the content is constitutionally protected.187  As such, 
claimants challenging the content on a website must bring a suit directly 
against the person who posted the objectionable material on the website. 
Currently, to obtain the identity of an anonymous speaker, a potential 
plaintiff must first subpoena the website administrator for the speaker’s 
registration information or Internet Protocol address (IP address).188  Then, 
the potential plaintiff would need to contact the appropriate ISP to obtain 
the actual identity of the speaker based on the IP address.189  This stage 
may require a second subpoena.190  This process is controversial because it 
allows plaintiffs, oftentimes corporate actors, to initiate lawsuits and obtain 
discovery of speakers’ identities without allowing the anonymous 
commenters an opportunity to challenge the subpoena request.191 
Frequently, individuals and businesses that are harmed by anonymous 
speech may be motivated to initiate lawsuits by a desire to silence their 
critics rather than by a desire to obtain redress for actual harm.192  These 
lawsuits are oftentimes referred to as “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation,” or SLAPP suits.193  To prevent legal process from being 
used to chill speech, several states have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes.194  
This section reviews the various standards that courts have applied when 
determining whether to grant a subpoena for the identity of an anonymous 
speaker and discusses commentators’ responses to these standards.195 
 
 186. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). 
 187. Id. § 230(c)(2)(A).  
 188. See Moore, supra note 184, at 472; see also Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1–40, 
326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 558–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Doe v. Cahill 884 A.2d 451, 454–55 (Del. 
2005). 
 189. See Sony Music, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 558–59; Cahill 884 A.2d at 454–55; Moore, 
supra note 184, at 472. 
 190. See Sony Music, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 558–59; Cahill 884 A.2d at 454–55; Moore, 
supra note 184, at 473. 
 191. David Sobel, The Process That “John Doe” Is Due:  Addressing the Legal 
Challenge to Internet Anonymity, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH 3, 14 (2000). 
 192. Victoria S. Ekstrand, Unmasking Jane and John Doe:  Online Anonymity and the 
First Amendment, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 405, 415 (2003). 
 193. Id. at 416. 
 194. Id.  Twenty states have enacted anti-SLAPP laws:  California, Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, and 
Washington. Id. at 416 n.50. 
 195. See, e.g., Calvert et al., supra note 148, at 16–26; Gleicher, supra note 145, at 350–
57; Malloy, supra note 66, at 1189–90; Martin, supra note 54, at 1228–37; Matthew 
Mazzotta, Note, Balancing Act:  Finding Consensus on Standards for Unmasking 
Anonymous Internet Speakers, 51 B.C. L. REV. 833, 844–59 (2010); Moore, supra note 184, 
at 473–81; Nickerson, supra note 83, at 864–68. 
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1.  Good Faith Standard 
Of the various standards, Virginia has adopted the least protective 
standard for granting subpoenas to reveal the identity of potential 
anonymous online speakers.  In In re Subpoena Deuces Tecum to America 
Online,196 a trial level court adopted the good-faith standard in a case where 
a corporate plaintiff sued individuals for publishing “defamatory material 
misrepresentations and confidential material insider information.”197  Under 
the good-faith standard, a court will grant a subpoena if the court is 
“satisfied by the pleadings or evidence supplied to that court,” the 
requesting party has a legitimate, good-faith belief that the speech was 
actionable, and the requested information is necessary to advance the 
claim.198  The Virginia Supreme Court reviewed this case, but did not 
render a decision on the discovery standard used by the trial court.199  The 
Virginia legislature adopted the trial court’s standard and has codified it 
into law.200 
The Virginia trial court recognized that a low threshold for obtaining the 
identity of speakers would limit the free speech rights of anonymous 
speakers.201  The court reasoned, however, that the potential dangers from 
revealing the plaintiff’s confidential information were greater than the 
anonymity interests of online speakers.202  Furthermore, the court reasoned 
that the state had a compelling interest in protecting companies from such 
wrongful conduct.203  Thus, the court decided to adopt a good-faith 
standard for subpoena disclosures.204 
Proponents of the good-faith standard argue that traditional libel law and 
the remedies it provides are not suited to addressing the challenges of an 
online context and, thus, different standards should be applied for online 
libel as opposed to traditional print libel.205  Specifically, they argue, 
internet speech has greater permanence, reaches a broader audience, and 
thus can have a larger impact. 206  They believe that adopting a less 
demanding test for disclosing the identity of the anonymous online speakers 
would help enforce current libel laws by making it easier for plaintiffs to 
bring claims for defamation.207 
 
 196. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Cir. Ct. 2000), 
rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Am. Online v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 
S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).  The Circuit Court of Virginia is a trial court. 
 197. Id. at 26–27. 
 198. Id. at 37. 
 199. Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001). 
 200. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1 (2012). 
 201. Am. Online I, 52 Va. Cir. at 35. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See Lyrissa B. Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace:  What Can We Learn from John 
Doe?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1373, 1390–91 (2009). 
 206. See Brenner, supra note 55, at 745–46; Martin, supra note 54, at 1234. 
 207. See Constantine, supra note 182, at 470 (arguing that liberal disclosure laws are 
necessary to enforce the law). 
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Professor Michael Vogel argues that additional standards at the subpoena 
stage create unnecessary challenges for plaintiffs because the current 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide sufficient protection to 
anonymous speakers.208  Professor Vogel notes that plaintiffs searching for 
an anonymous speaker are unlikely to waste resources and effort unless 
they believe that they have a viable legal claim, because initiating a lawsuit 
can be time consuming and cumbersome.209  Furthermore, plaintiffs are 
unlikely to pursue false claims, because they may be subject to Rule 11 
sanctions.210  Thus, Professor Vogel argues, it is unnecessary to provide 
additional legal protections for anonymous speakers, and a good-faith 
subpoena standard adequately balances the interests of anonymous speakers 
with potential victims of anonymous speech.211 
Opponents of the good-faith test find that the good faith standard is the 
least exacting standard and criticize it as insufficient to protect the rights of 
anonymous speakers because it is too easily satisfied.212  These opponents 
argue that the good-faith test does not establish a practical or reliable 
standard of determining the plaintiff’s actual reasons for filing the lawsuit, 
essentially depriving the defendant of any right to anonymity.213  
Furthermore, they believe that the good faith standard fails to provide 
courts with any guidance as to how the standard should be applied or what 
amount of pleading or evidence is necessary to “satisfy” the court that a 
commenter’s identity should be disclosed.214 
2.  Balancing Test Standards 
In Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com,215 the Northern District of 
California established the prima facie test for granting a subpoena in a case 
where the defendant allegedly committed trademark infringement under 
federal and California law.216  Under the prima facie standard, a court 
 
 208. Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants:  The Case Against 
Excessive Hand-Wringing over Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REV. 795, 854–55 (2004). 
 209. Id. at 854. 
 210. See id. at 855; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c); 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR 
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1336 (3d ed. 2004).  Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires lawyers to certify that any claim, defense or legal 
contention they make in a pleading or written motion to the court is warranted by existing 
law or a nonfrivolous reason for extending the law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2); see also 
5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, § 1334. 
 211. See Vogel, supra note 208, at 855. 
 212. Calvert et al., supra note 148, at 41; Martin, supra note 54, at 1228. 
 213. See, e.g., Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 952 (D.C. 2009) (“The good faith test 
. . . may needlessly strip defendants of anonymity in situations where there is no substantial 
evidence of wrongdoing, effectively giving little or no First Amendment protection to that 
anonymity.”); Calvert et al., supra note 148, at 41. 
 214. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 184, at 474 (theorizing that “satisfied by the pleading” 
likely did not include a substantive review of the plaintiff’s claims). 
 215. 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
 216. Id. at 576; see also Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 564 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (applying a balancing test in a case alleging copyright infringement for 
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should grant a subpoena that reveals the identity of a defendant if the 
plaintiff:  identifies the party with specificity,217 makes a good-faith effort 
to locate the individual and complies with service of process,218 can 
withstand a motion to dismiss,219 and has filed a discovery request that 
explains why the information is sought and identifies a limited number of 
persons on whom discovery process might be served.220  The key difference 
between this test and the good-faith standard is that the Seescandy test 
requires the plaintiff to provide notice and withstand a motion to dismiss, 
while the good-faith standard has no such requirement.221 
In Seescandy, the Northern District of California recognized that the need 
to provide redress to injured parties must be balanced against the right of 
individuals to speak anonymously online.222  The court also recognized that 
if the standard for revealing subpoenas is too low, individuals could use the 
discovery process to harass or intimidate individuals who have committed 
no wrongful act.223  By requiring the plaintiff to show that it could survive a 
motion to dismiss, the court believed that it could minimize or prevent the 
use of discovery in harassing or intimidating anonymous online speakers.224 
After reviewing Seescandy, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court 
of New Jersey adopted a more demanding version of the prima facie test in 
Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe.225  That case arose when anonymous 
speakers posted allegedly defamatory comments regarding a corporation on 
a Yahoo! message board.226  The court held that it would grant the 
plaintiff’s subpoena request if (1) the plaintiff attempted to notify the 
anonymous posters that they were subject to a subpoena or application for 
disclosure, (2) the plaintiff identified the statements that constitute 
actionable speech, (3) the court determined that the plaintiff had a prima 
facie case against the John Doe defendant that was supported by an 
evidentiary showing, and (4) the court balanced the defendant’s First 
Amendment right to anonymous speech against the necessity of disclosure 
for the plaintiff’s action to proceed.227 
Although both the Dendrite test and the Seescandy test require the 
plaintiff to identify the defendant, attempt to notify the plaintiff of the 
pending action, and demonstrate a prima facie case, the Dendrite court 
interpreted the motion to dismiss standard as being more flexible than did 
 
illegal use of file-sharing programs because even though “file sharing is not engaging in true 
expression,” it is still “entitled to First Amendment protection”). 
 217. Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578. 
 218. Id. at 579. 
 219. Id. at 579–80. 
 220. Id. at 580. 
 221. Compare id., with In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 
(Cir. Ct. 2000). 
 222. Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 578–79. 
 225. 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
 226. Id. at 763. 
 227. Id. at 760–61; see also Moore, supra note 184, at 478–80. 
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the district court in Seescandy.228  The Dendrite court indicated its belief 
that the First Amendment concerns in Seescandy were less serious than 
those in Dendrite, because Seescandy involved a trademark infringement 
suit while Dendrite involved an allegation of defamation; therefore, the 
Dendrite court adopted a test that more strongly considered the First 
Amendment concerns.229  The Dendrite test interpreted the Seescandy test’s 
motion-to-dismiss prong as a “flexible, non-technical, fact-sensitive 
mechanism” to ensure that plaintiffs do not abuse the judicial system to 
harass online speakers or chill online speech.230  Thus, the court held that it 
was appropriate for the trial court judge to require evidence of the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case when deciding whether to dismiss the case.231 
Proponents of the Dendrite balancing approach believe that it does not 
state the right to anonymous speech too broadly, and that it establishes a 
standard that plaintiffs can potentially meet, as demonstrated by cases in 
which courts have granted plaintiffs’ discovery requests.232  They also 
believe that the various prongs of Dendrite adequately consider the interests 
of both parties by looking at the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s case, which 
helps to protect the defendant’s anonymity unless there is a valid 
justification.233 
Professor Vogel has criticized the Dendrite balancing test because it 
grants the trial court judge too much discretionary power, since the test 
requires the judge to look to the merits of a potential claim.234  
Furthermore, he argues, the trial judge’s determination is reviewed on an 
abuse of discretion standard, which makes it very difficult for the appellate 
court to reverse the lower court’s determination.235  This discretionary 
power can essentially deprive the plaintiff of his right to seek redress 
because the lawsuit cannot proceed without determining the identity of the 
defendant.236 
3.  Summary Judgment Standard 
In Doe v. Cahill,237  the Delaware Supreme Court established the 
summary judgment standard—one of the most demanding standards for 
granting a subpoena—to decide whether disclose an anonymous online 
 
 228. Cf. Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 771. 
 229. Id. at 767. 
 230. Id. at 771. 
 231. Id. at 760. 
 232. See, e.g., Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 149, at 1601–02 (including a balancing prong 
in their test to determine whether to grant a subpoena request); Mazzotta, supra note 195, at 
862–63; Moore, supra note 184, at 483. 
 233. Mazzotta, supra note 195, at 862–63 (discussing how balancing tests give courts the 
greatest discretion to consider the specific facts of the case); Moore, supra note 184, at 484. 
 234. Vogel, supra note 208, at 809. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 809–10. 
 237. 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). 
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speaker’s identity.238  The Cahill standard requires a plaintiff to “support 
his defamation claim with facts sufficient to defeat a summary judgment 
motion,”239  make reasonable efforts to notify the defendant, and “submit 
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for each essential element 
of the claim in question.”240  The court noted, however, that the plaintiff 
would not be required to provide evidence for those elements for which it 
would be impossible to obtain evidence without knowing the defendant’s 
identity.241  For example, in a public figure defamation case, the plaintiff 
would be required to “prove that:  (1) the defendant made a defamatory 
statement; (2) concerning the plaintiff; (3) the statement was published; . . . 
(4) a third-party would understand the character of the communication as 
defamatory . . . [and] that (5) the statement is false.”242  The plaintiff would 
not be required to prove that the defendant made the statement with actual 
malice.243  The court denied the plaintiff’s subpoena request, holding that 
any viewer would understand that the comment was intended as an opinion 
and would be unlikely to believe the veracity of the comment.244 
In Cahill, a public figure had filed a defamation and invasion of privacy 
claim to seek the identity of an anonymous commenter from a Delaware 
state news blog.245  At the trial level, the Superior Court of Delaware had 
adopted America Online’s good-faith standard.246  However, the Delaware 
Supreme Court rejected this approach as insufficient to protect the rights of 
online speakers.247  The court discussed the unique features of speech on 
the internet248 and analogized online speech with the “modern equivalent of 
political pamphleteering.”249  Thus, the court held that its standard for 
granting a subpoena must reach the appropriate balance between 
anonymous free speech rights and the rights of individuals against 
 
 238. Id. at 457. 
 239. Moore, supra note 184, at 477. 
 240. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 463 (citing In re Asbestos Litig., 799 A.2d 1151, 1152 (Del. 
2002)). 
 241. Id. at 463. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 464. 
 244. Id. at 465 (“The ‘reasonable reader, looking at the hundreds and thousands of 
postings about the company from a wide variety of posters, would not expect that [the 
defendant] was airing anything other than his personal views . . . .’” (quoting Global 
Telemedia Int’l, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1268 (C.D. Cal. 2001))). 
 245. Id. at 454.  The comments criticized Cahill’s performance as a city councilman, 
stating that “[a]nyone who has spent any amount of time with Cahill would be keenly aware 
of such character flaws, not to mention an obvious mental deterioration.” Id. (emphasis 
omitted).  Another comment stated that “Gahill [sic] is as paranoid as everyone in the town 
thinks he is.” Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted). 
 246. Cahill v. Doe, 879 A.2d 943 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005), rev’d, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 
2005). 
 247. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454. 
 248. Specifically, the court notes that online speech is “less hierarchical and 
discriminatory than in the real world because it disguises status indicators such as race, class, 
and age.” Id. at 456 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 249. Id. at 456. 
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defamation.250  The court found that the summary judgment standard would 
best achieve this balance.251 
The court rejected the good-faith standard because it believed that 
plaintiffs would be able to meet that standard too easily, which might cause 
plaintiffs to harass defendants and chill online speech.252  The court rejected 
the motion to dismiss standard because the threshold for a Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)253 motion was merely a pleading standard that 
required the plaintiff to provide the opposing party with notice of the claims 
against it, and thus, was also insufficient to protect the free speech rights of 
anonymous online speakers.254  Although the court approved of Dendrite’s 
heightened standard for granting subpoenas, it found that the standard was 
too convoluted and unnecessarily complex.255  Thus, the court adopted the 
summary judgment standard, finding that it properly balanced the interests 
of anonymous online speakers with those of individuals who might be 
harmed by such speech.256 
Critics of the Cahill standard argue that balancing tests are important to 
address the various speech concerns implicated by a particular lawsuit, and 
that a summary judgment standard does not fully consider the potential free 
speech concerns.257  They note that a plaintiff may be able to meet the 
summary judgment standard, but “the harm done by revealing the speaker’s 
identity may far outweigh the damage of the libel.”258 
The Cahill summary judgment standard has also been criticized for 
increasing legal uncertainty.259  Some courts interpret the Cahill standard as 
less demanding than Dendrite, while other courts interpret the Cahill 
standard as more demanding than Dendrite.260  Furthermore, by adopting a 
procedural label, the court created confusion because the standard does not 
 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 457. 
 252. Id. at 457–58. 
 253. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).  A defendant makes a Rule 12(b)(6) motion when the 
defendant believes that the plaintiff, in their complaint, “fail[ed] to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted.” Id.; see also 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 210, § 1355. 
 254. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 458–59. 
 255. See id. at 461. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See, e.g., Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 720 (Ariz. 2007) (“[R]equiring the 
court to balance the parties’ competing interests is necessary to achieve appropriate rulings 
in the vast array of factually distinct cases likely to involve anonymous speech.”); Ashley I. 
Kissinger & Katherine Larsen, Untangling the Legal Labyrinth:  Protections for Anonymous 
Online Speech, 13 NO. 9 J. INTERNET L. 1, 19 (2010). 
 258. Jonathan D. Jones, Note, Cybersmears and John Doe:  How Far Should First 
Amendment Protections of Anonymous Internet Speakers Extend?, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 
421, 439 (2009). 
 259. See Kissinger & Larsen, supra note 257, at 18. 
 260. Compare Krinsky v. Doe, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 242–43 (Ct. App. 2008) (adopting 
the Cahill standard because the Dendrite standard “required too much” and the motion to 
dismiss standard was too low), with Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 456–
57 (Md. 2009) (adopting the test from Dendrite, because the summary judgment standard 
would set the bar too high and “undermine personal accountability and the search for truth”). 
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actually adhere to the strict procedural definitions of the term summary 
judgment.261 
Professor Malloy criticizes the Cahill standard because it fails to account 
for the inherent characteristics of online speech.262  Although courts have 
thus far sought to treat speech on the internet in the same manner as 
traditional forms of speech, Malloy notes that online speech is inherently 
different from traditional forms of speech, because it is more pervasive, 
permanent, and accessible.263  For example, defamation requires defendants 
to make an untrue statement of fact and for readers to view the statement as 
fact.264  By finding that readers are likely to interpret the statements on 
blogs as the speaker’s opinion, rather than as a factual assertion, Professor 
Malloy argues that the Cahill court failed to consider that the opinion of 
others may nevertheless injure the plaintiff’s reputation or cause him or her 
to suffer adverse consequences.265  Following this reasoning, the Cahill 
standard—which uses a general defamation standard—is not properly 
suited to online speech, because it is almost impossible for plaintiffs to 
obtain redress for statements made by anonymous commenters.266 
4.  2TheMart Test 
Courts have recognized that a different standard should apply for 
obtaining the identity of a commenter when he is sought as a witness rather 
than as a defendant, but have not delineated the distinction.267  In Doe v. 
2TheMart.com, Inc., the Western District of Washington established a test 
for granting subpoenas to identify potential witnesses.268  Under this test, 
the plaintiff must clearly show that (1) the subpoena was issued in good 
faith, (2) the information sought related to a core claim or defense, (3) the 
information is directly and materially relevant to that claim or defense, and 
(4) such information cannot be obtained from other sources.269  Given that 
this holding applies only to witness disclosure, this standard has not 
received much attention from other courts or academics.270 
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 265. Malloy, supra note 66, at 1190–91. 
 266. Id. at 1191–92. 
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B.  Legislative Proposals Seeking To Restrict Anonymous Online Speech 
The issue of anonymous online speech has received significant media 
attention271 that has motivated state legislatures to propose legislation that 
would ban or restrict anonymous online commenting.272  Virginia, the only 
state that has passed legislation that addresses the standard for disclosing 
the identity of an anonymous commenter, has adopted the good-faith test.273  
However, this section will focus on legislative proposals from Georgia, 
California, New Jersey, and New York that sought to ban or limit 
anonymous speech rights. 
Georgia was the first state that sought to enact legislation restricting the 
use of false identities online.  In 1996, it passed Act 1029, which made it 
unlawful for “any person . . . [to] knowingly . . . transmit any data through a 
computer network . . . if such data uses any individual name, trade name, 
registered trademark, logo, legal or official seal, or copyrighted symbol to 
falsely identify the person.”274  The American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) challenged the Act in court, arguing that it was unconstitutional 
under the First Amendment because it created an impermissible content-
based restriction and limited individuals’ right to speak anonymously.275  A 
district court found that the ACLU would be likely to prevail in its 
challenge to the law and therefore granted a preliminary injunction 
prohibiting enforcement of the Act.276  Although Georgia state courts have 
not yet addressed the constitutionality of this Act, in practice, it has not 
been used to restrict or regulate anonymous online speech.277 
Ten years later, the New Jersey legislature introduced a bill that would 
have required an operator of a computer service or an ISP to “establish and 
maintain reasonable procedures to enable any person to request and obtain 
disclosure of the legal name and address of an information content provider 
 
 271. See, e.g., Sara Gates, Anonymous Comment Ban:  Internet Protection Act Threatens 
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 272. See, e.g., A.B. 1143, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003); A.B. 1327, 212th Leg., 1st 
Sess. (N.J. 2006); A.B. 8688, 2012 Leg., 235th Sess. (N.Y. 2012). 
 273. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1 (2012); see also supra Part III.A.1.  California also 
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 275. ACLU of Ga. v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1230–31 (N.D. Ga. 1997). 
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After ACLU of Georgia v. Miller, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 513 (1998). 
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[i.e., speaker] who posts false or defamatory information about the person 
on a public forum website.”278  Any person who is damaged as a result of 
false or defamatory written messages may sue an ISP that fails to comply 
with this provision for compensatory and punitive damages.279  However, 
the bill did not define the circumstances under which it would be 
“reasonable” for an ISP to disclose a commenter’s identity.  The New 
Jersey bill was withdrawn in February of 2007 and no subsequent 
legislation has been proposed thus far.280 
In March 2012, the New York State legislature proposed the Internet 
Protection Act,281 which takes a similar approach as New Jersey to address 
anonymous online commenting.  The bill’s purpose, based on statements by 
sponsoring legislators, is to lower the incidence of cyberbullying.282  The 
original version of the bill in the state assembly and the current version 
being considered by the state senate require that: 
A web site administrator upon request shall remove any comments posted 
on his or her web site by an anonymous poster unless such anonymous 
poster agrees to attach his or her name to the post and confirms that his or 
her IP address, legal name, and home address are accurate.  All web site 
administrators shall have a contact number or e-mail address posted for 
such removal requests, clearly visible in any sections where comments are 
posted.283 
After receiving significant public hostility toward the bill,284 the State 
Assembly revised the bill to allow only targets of anonymous posters to 
request that the comments be removed, and to require web site 
administrators to “make a good faith effort to determine that comments 
regarding a victim are factually based . . . and not opinions.”285 
The New York and New Jersey proposals are somewhat analogous to the 
notice and take-down provisions under the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA).286  The DMCA shields ISPs from liability if, after being 
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notified by the copyright holder of the infringing nature of the work, they 
remove the material from their websites.287  Although the New Jersey and 
New York proposals operate differently, they also create incentives for ISPs 
to remove certain material from their websites.  Some commentators have 
advocated for imposing more liability on ISPs as a way to address the 
problems of online defamation.288  They argue that notice and take-down 
procedures are the most efficient and cost-effective mechanisms to regulate 
defamatory online speech.289  However, it is unclear whether such 
procedures can be adequately designed to restrict defamatory speech, while 
continuing to protect legitimate free speech interests of online speakers.290 
Other states have sought to limit the anonymous speech rights of a 
narrower category of speakers, namely convicted sex offenders.  In 2012, 
California passed Proposition 35,291 which, among other things, requires 
convicted sex offenders to register “[a] list of any and all Internet identifiers 
established or used by the person”292 and “[a] list of any and all Internet 
service providers used by the person” with the Department of Justice.293  
This law will effectively abolish the right to anonymous speech for 
convicted sex offenders.294  The ACLU and the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation filed a lawsuit the day after California voted to approve 
Proposition 35.295  The Northern District Court of California granted 
plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, but it has not yet ruled on 
the constitutionality of the Proposition.296  The State filed an appeal with 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on February 12, 2013.297 
The Ninth Circuit may be guided by legal developments in Georgia.  The 
Georgia state legislature passed a law that also required convicted sex 
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offenders to register information about their online identity.298  However, 
the Northern District of Georgia declared the law unconstitutional because 
the statute was vague and not narrowly tailored to accomplish a legitimate 
state interest.299 
IV.  CREATING A COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL STANDARD 
Judicial subpoena standards and legislative regulations restricting 
anonymous speech approach the issue of anonymous speech from different 
angles.  Subpoena standards allow judges to make individualized 
determinations based on the particular facts of the case, but this leads to the 
patchwork of approaches that courts have so far taken.300  Such discordant 
standards create uncertainty regarding individuals’ speech rights as 
speakers’ rights will be affected both by the underlying action and 
applicable law.  In contrast, legislative standards may create more 
uniformity, but the legislature may impose categorical restrictions on a 
narrow type of speech, such as defamation or fighting words.301  If the 
legislature wants to establish broader content-based speech regulations, 
those regulations must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest to be deemed constitutionally permissible.302  Part IV.A analyzes 
the aforementioned judicial standards and concludes that the government 
should adopt the Cahill standard, which requires plaintiffs to meet a 
summary judgment standard before obtaining disclosure.  Part IV.B 
discusses how the legislature should expand the legal rights for victims of 
defamation and online harms to balance the protection of anonymous 
speech with the problems it may cause. 
A.  Subpoena Disclosure Standard 
In reality, anonymous online commenting does not reflect the historical 
notion that anonymous speech promotes democratic principles by allowing 
freedom of participation as envisaged in Talley and McIntyre.303  Yet, many 
of the justifications for restricting anonymous speech used in Buckley and 
Citizens United—such as protecting the integrity of the political process 
and providing citizens with the information they need to make informed 
political decisions304—are not present to the same extent in anonymous 
online speech.305  Because anonymous online speech “is, on average, less 
valuable than nonanonymous speech,”306 it should be afforded an 
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intermediate degree of protection when parties seek to identify these 
speakers.  The standard that best accomplishes this aim is the summary 
judgment test established by the Delaware Supreme Court in Cahill.307  The 
Cahill standard should be adopted because it offers the highest level of 
protection for anonymous speakers and thus advances speakers’ free speech 
rights, is the most straightforward to apply, and is preferable to the 
alternative tests.308 
Cahill requires plaintiffs to meet a high burden—proving a prima facie 
case or meeting a summary judgment standard—before they can discover 
an anonymous speakers’ identity, thereby affording the greatest level of 
protection for anonymous speakers.309  It is important to protect anonymous 
speakers’ rights to avoid creating a chilling effect on online speech.310  
Under a marketplace of ideas theory for free speech rights, various ideas 
will compete and the truth will ultimately prevail.311  Although some critics 
argue that speech on the internet has a higher potential for causing injury,312 
it is important to note the context of speech when determining whether 
injury will result.  For example, readers are less likely to trust the veracity 
of a college gossip website than that of a reputable website.313  Thus, the 
mere existence of speech will not necessarily cause injury. 
Anonymous speech rights also help promote the truth-seeking function of 
free speech protections by allowing individuals to disclose information 
without fear of reprisal.314  If the disclosure standard is too low, it will 
allow individuals or critics to obtain a speaker’s identity for the purpose of 
harassment or intimidation.315  Statistically, plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail 
in a defamation suit and most John Doe subpoenas are sought by corporate 
plaintiffs trying to silence their critics.316  To prevent needless disclosure of 
an anonymous speaker’s identity, courts should not require disclosure 
unless there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the plaintiff will win on 
the merits of the case.  Otherwise, speakers may be wary of making 
statements if they believe that the message can be traced back to them, 
creating a chilling effect on speech.317  This type of scenario may arise in 
situations where an employee wants to reveal information about his 
 
 307. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 308. For a discussion of the Cahill standard, see supra notes 239–44 and accompanying 
text. 
 309. See supra notes 239–40 and accompanying text. 
 310. See supra Part II.A. 
 311. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. But see Scot Wilson, Corporate 
Criticism on the Internet:  The Fine Line Between Anonymous Speech and Cybersmear, 
29 PEPP. L. REV. 533, 540–42 (2002) (arguing that the “free marketplace” interpretation of 
anonymous online speech is limited because of the difficulty in drawing a line between 
lawful and defamatory speech). 
 312. See Malloy, supra note 66, at 1190; see also supra notes 169–72 and accompanying 
text. 
 313. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text. 
 314. See supra Part II.A. 
 315. See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text. 
 316. See Moore, supra note 184, at 470–71. 
 317. See supra notes 149–55 and accompanying text. 
 3686 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
employer that may be of important public interest, but fears employer 
retaliation.318 
The Cahill summary judgment test better protects anonymous speech, 
because it is more straightforward and easier to apply than Dendrite’s 
multifactored balancing test.319  The fifth prong of the balancing test in 
Dendrite, which seeks to balance the protections of speech and its potential 
harm, is redundant because the same balancing is inherent in the summary 
judgment test.320  Additionally, the balancing test creates ambiguity, which 
makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to raise meritorious claims, because 
plaintiffs will be unsure when they have a valid legal claim.321  Uncertainty 
in outcome may deter some plaintiffs from litigating their cases, thereby 
preventing them from accessing justice and allowing speakers to continue 
making potentially defamatory comments.  The summary judgment 
standard includes an inherent balancing test because it permits disclosure 
only when a plaintiff has a viable legal claim.322 
The summary judgment test may protect less speech than a balancing test 
because it does not protect speakers when the speaker’s interest in 
maintaining anonymity exceeds the plaintiff’s interest in pursuing a viable 
legal claim.  However, the summary judgment standard is preferable, 
because a balancing test would grant anonymous online speakers greater 
speech protections than they would have in other speech contexts.323 
The summary judgment test is also preferable to the good-faith standard, 
because the good-faith standard is too easily satisfied, allowing disclosure 
even in situations where the speaker may have an important anonymity 
interest.324  The good-faith standard gives plaintiffs an incentive to file suits 
to discover the identity of the commenter even if the plaintiff lacks a legal 
claim.325  This standard essentially deprives defendants from saying 
anything derogatory about another person, because such comments would 
likely be sufficient to create a “good-faith” belief that the speech is 
actionable.  Yet, the Supreme Court has held that speech cannot be 
restricted merely because it may be offensive.326  Thus, the good-faith test 
fails to afford anonymous speakers adequate protection.  The good-faith 
standard comes from an early case addressing online anonymity but has not 
received much traction, with modern courts instead choosing to adopt a 
balancing test or summary judgment standard.327 
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Professor Susanna Moore argues that the Cahill standard is too 
demanding because it is impossible for plaintiffs to prove malice without 
knowing the identity of the defendant.328  Professor Moore, however, fails 
to note that the Cahill standard only requires the plaintiff to prove the 
elements that are within their control and thus would not be required to 
prove malice to obtain the subpoena.329  Yet, this provision leads others to 
criticize Cahill for purportedly adopting a procedural approach while 
relaxing certain requirements, thereby confusing potential litigants.330  This 
argument is technical and does not address the merits of the Cahill test.  As 
a practical matter, it would be impossible for the plaintiff to provide all the 
evidence necessary to support his claim without knowing the defendant’s 
identity.  In choosing among the various standards, requiring the plaintiff to 
provide as much evidence as possible—as the Cahill standard requires—is 
the next best alternative to ensure that the litigation is not frivolous or being 
raised for malicious purposes. 
Some critics of the Cahill test argue instead that Dendrite’s notice 
requirement, which requires plaintiffs to notify the speaker of the pendency 
of the subpoena request, provides greater protection for anonymous 
speakers because it allows them to defend themselves.331  Professor Moore, 
in particular, argues that it is fairer to place the burden on the plaintiff than 
on the ISP, because the plaintiff has a greater interest in the litigation and 
thus is more likely to give notice than a disinterested party.332  These 
commentators, however, provide no reason that the notice requirement 
cannot be applied to the summary judgment standard.333  In Cahill, the 
court specifically included a notice requirement, thereby demonstrating that 
a notice requirement can be adopted without changing the nature of the 
standard.334 
Despite the criticism of the summary judgment standard, it remains the 
best standard for protecting anonymous online speech.  Some individuals 
may abuse their anonymity rights,335 but lowering the standard for 
disclosure is unlikely to have a significant impact unless the speaker can be 
subjected to legal sanctions to deter future misconduct.  Thus, courts should 
adopt the summary judgment standard for deciding when to reveal an 
anonymous speaker’s identity. 
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Additionally, states should adopt a summary judgment standard to permit 
the disclosure of an anonymous speaker’s identity regardless of the 
underlying dispute.  The Ninth Circuit and Professor Clay Calvert argue 
that the standard for disclosing the identity of the speaker should depend 
upon the nature of the underlying litigation.336  However, the summary 
judgment standard inherently accounts for the nature of the underlying suit 
by allowing discovery only when the plaintiff provides evidence to prove 
wrongdoing by the speaker.337  Imposing different standards for various 
types of speech, while preferable in theory, would create problems in 
practice by creating uncertainty in an area of the law that should be clear.338 
B.  Legislative Responses 
The government should not seek to ban anonymous online speech 
because, despite those who would abuse the right, anonymous online 
speech serves many legitimate interests.  Since most legislation that restricts 
the right likely will be found unconstitutional,339 legislatures should instead 
regulate anonymous online commenting indirectly by redefining the set of 
harms for which individuals may seek redress.340 
Individual states should not try to address the problems associated with 
anonymous online commenting by imposing restrictions or bans on such 
speech, because any law they adopt would likely create a dormant 
commerce clause problem.341  If one state tries to regulate the internet, it 
would create jurisdictional problems because the legislation would 
inherently implicate activity in other states.342  Even national regulation of 
anonymous speech may be legally problematic because of its international 
implications.343 
Legislatures should not seek to create a take-down procedure analogous 
to those for copyright infringement under the DMCA, because there is an 
inherent difference between the values that underlie free speech and those 
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that support copyright law.344  Copyright laws are meant to protect the 
economic interests of those who produce expressive works.345  In contrast, 
the First Amendment protects the freedom of expression.346  Although 
removal of content may restrict some speech, the Supreme Court has 
rejected First Amendment challenges in copyright infringement cases.347  It 
is reasonable for courts to err on the side of restricting the dissemination of 
infringing material, because the interest of the copyright owner may be lost 
if it is not enforced in a timely manner.  However, the First Amendment is 
meant to protect expression, and that right would be undermined if ISPs or 
website administrators were required to remove speech.348 
Moreover, determining copyright infringement is an objective assessment 
that the ISP can resolve, while speech regulation is more subjective and 
harder to define.  Anonymous online speech includes a broader range of 
speech, much of which the government cannot restrict.349  An ISP or 
website administrator could not be expected to reasonably know whether 
speech may be restricted, which is likely to result in an overregulation of 
speech.  Additionally, unfamiliarity with the legal standard for permissible 
speech regulation could cause unequal application of the law, because each 
website administrator could adopt different standards for take-downs.350  
Further, the determination would be subject to the individual biases of the 
website administrator.  This unequal application of a statute would prevent 
the creation of clear standards, which, in turn, is likely to deter protected 
speech. 
The proposed bill from New York illustrates other constitutional defects 
of laws that seek to limit anonymous speech through the use of take-down 
procedures because both versions of the bill are vague, overbroad and 
underinclusive.351  The proposed laws are vague because they fail to put 
speakers on notice of what speech is protected and to provide guidelines for 
when website administrators should remove speech.352  Although the 
Assembly version is more specific and instructs administrators to “make a 
good faith effort to determine that comments regarding a victim are 
factually based,”353 it fails to explain what actions are required for a good-
 
 344. See supra Part II.A (discussing the values underlying free speech protection). 
 345. Cf. Kevin M. Lemley, The Innovative Medium Defense:  A Doctrine To Promote the 
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 346. See supra notes 141, 149 and accompanying text. 
 347. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1985). 
 348. See supra notes 153–55 and accompanying text. 
 349. See supra Part I.A. 
 350. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 351. See supra notes 40–44, 283–85 and accompanying text. 
 352. See supra notes 40–42, 283–85 and accompanying text. 
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faith effort.354  Furthermore, both versions of the bill are underinclusive 
because by addressing only instances of anonymous attacks, they fail to 
address instances of cyberbullying—the bill’s stated purpose—that are 
conducted publicly or through identifiable social media profiles.355 
The New York proposal that the state senate is considering is content 
neutral, because it requires an administrator to remove all anonymous 
comments upon request, without regard to the content of the speech.356  
Thus, the regulation would be subject to intermediate scrutiny, requiring 
that the law be substantially related to an important governmental 
interest.357  While the bill’s goal of combating cyberbullying is an 
important government interest,358 the law is not substantially related to that 
aim because it restricts nonbullying speech.359  The law is 
unconstitutionally overbroad because it may result in the restriction of 
speech that is otherwise constitutionally permissible.360  Instead, the 
legislature should adopt a different solution that is more narrowly tailored 
to achieve the law’s ends without infringing upon First Amendment 
rights.361 
Online speech falls into many categories, each subject to its own standard 
of scrutiny.362  Thus, any legislation seeking to regulate anonymous online 
speech would need to differentiate between the various types of speech.363  
The New York State Assembly, perhaps realizing this, revised the bill to 
limit its application to defamatory speech.364  This proposal, however, is 
content based because it requires website administrators to remove 
comments upon request based on the speaker’s message.365  As such, the 
law is subject to strict scrutiny and must be narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling government interest.366  Even assuming that the government’s 
interest in ending defamatory online speech is compelling for the purposes 
of the First Amendment, the regulation is likely unconstitutional because it 
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is overbroad.367  Governments may regulate defamatory speech because the 
reputational interest of the target of the speech exceeds the speaker’s 
interest in the speaker (which is low, because such speech is oftentimes an 
issue of private, rather than public, concern).368  The government, however, 
may not regulate speech merely because it is offensive or distasteful.369  
The New York bill essentially requires website administrators to remove 
postings upon the request of the target of the speech, which is likely to 
result in the removal of speech that, while offensive, fails to meet the 
specific legal requirements for defamation.370 
Given the constitutional difficulties in shaping legislation to restrict 
anonymous online speech, the legislature should seek alternative solutions 
to address the issue of cyberbullying and other forms of harmful online 
speech. 
CONCLUSION 
The right to free speech, including the right to anonymous speech, is a 
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution.  Though the government 
may restrict certain forms of speech through regulation, and other types of 
speech by imposing civil liability for harmful speech, those regulations and 
restrictions must be justified based on the severity of the limitation being 
imposed.371  As more speech is disseminated through the internet, the 
government must find a way to balance the interest of speakers with that of 
individuals who may be harmed by defamatory or hateful speech.  Courts 
have adopted various standards for granting subpoena requests to allow 
discovery of anonymous speakers’ identities.  Appellate courts should adopt 
the summary judgment standard, because it best protects individuals’ 
speech rights without making it impossible for plaintiffs to seek redress for 
their injuries. 
Despite their concern for the potential harms arising from anonymous 
online speech, legislatures should not seek to ban anonymous speech.  
Instead, they should redefine defamation in an online context to account for 
the differences between online speech and other traditional mediums of 
speech.  This would expand the remedies available to potential victims of 
harmful speech and allow them to bring suit when the interests of the 
victims exceed the free speech interests of the speaker. 
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